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In the pref~~en&&idi&
we develop the view that
the h e has cornre for a further round of refonn of
the farceid-sham s y s k With Eomm about evasion
&ply res01ved~we dimct attention to the underlying
architecture of the forced share. Taldng the UPC pro&domi as our model, we point to serious discrepancies
between purpose and practice in the forced-share system, and we propose legislative comectives. We show
that our proposal would remedy the worst shortcoming of modem American forced-share law -its
astonishinginsensitivity to differences in the duration
of a marriage. If a marriage ends in death, the statutes
currently in force allow the surviving spouse the same
entitlement in the decedent%estate whether the marriage lasted five days or five decades. We recommend
a means for adjusting the forced share to the duration
of the marriage.
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Marital-Property Regimes
and e Ration e c the Forced Share

The basic principle in the common law states is that
marital status does not affect the ownership of property. The regime is one of separate property. Each
spouse owns all that he or she earns, even when the
logic of the marriage is that one spouse earns less,
or nothing at all, in order to enable the other to earn
more. By contrast, in the eight community-property
states. and in theSpanish legal system from whence
our community-property states derived their model,
each spouse would have an immediate half interest in
the property that the other earns during the marriage.
This half interest in the fruits of the marriage is known
in academic parlance as the community of acquests
(in contrast to the so-called universal community, in
which spousal rights attach even to property earned
before the mamage or acquired through inheritance
or gift).
Legal-academic opinion in the United States today
generally prefers the community of acquests over common law separate property. By granting each spouse
an immediate half interest in the earnings of the
other, the community of acquests recognizes that the
couple's enterprise is in essence collaborative.
In 1983, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws endorsed a species of the community of_acquestswhen it promulgated the Uniform
Marital Property Act (UMPA).Although Wisconsin
adopted a version of UMPA and is now reckoned as
the ninth community-property state, the prospects
for widespread adoption of UMPA in the separateproperty states to which it is addressed appear bleak.
The act has encountered resistance from the organized
bar, in large measure for fear that the scheme of lifetime dual management that the act propounds is

too complex.
It k essential to understand that American forcedshare law is entirely a consequenceof the common law's
sepamte-propertyregime fm marital property. Our
community-property states do not have forced-share
statutes. Having recognized in each spouse a reciprocal half interest in the earnings of the other, no further
adjustmentis thought necessary when death later
terminates the marriage. Forced-share law, in contrast,
is the law of the second best. It undertakes upon death
to correct the failure of a separate-property state to
create the appropriatelifetime rights for spouses in
each other's earnings.
The preeminent legal and social policy that underlies the forced-share statutes is to limit the freedom of
testation of the primary breadwinner, in recognition
of the economic dependency that a conventional marriage characteristicallyentails for the spouse who specializes in what the economists call household production. Forced-share law is not Yuppie law. If both John
and Mary were routinely going to be vice presidents at
the Morgan Guaranty Bank, nobody would much care
about giving them reciprocal claims in each otheis estates. Indeed, under existing law serious Yuppies will
contract out of the forced-share system by means of a
premarital agreement. For the future and away from
elite groups, however, traditional patterns of intrafamilial specialization are continuing.
Interestingly, the protective policy of the forcedshare statutes has found expression in a pair of competing theories. One is the support or need theory; the
other is the contribution or marital-property theory.
As for the support theory, the label pretty much suggests the argument. The breadwinner has a duty of
support during his lifetime, which he ought not to be
able to evade in death. If, however, you probe the
typical forced-share statute, you will find that it is
quite deficient in implementing a support policy. On
the bne hand, the fixed fraction, usually a third of the
decedent's estate, may be woefully inadequate to the
surviving spouse's needs, especiallyin a modest estate. On the other hand, all but a few forced-share
statutes award the fixed fraction regardless of whether
the survivor is in actual need -that is, even when the
survivor has independent means that are quite ample.
Both these objections to the support theory are of a
similar sort -that the forced-sharestatute addresses
need badly because it adopts a categoricrather than an
individuated standard.
The other theory, the contribution theory, relates
forced-share law back to what we have identified as its
origin, in the shortcomingsof the separate-property
marital-property regime. Spouses are highly likely
to have contributed to each other's nominal earnings
through various forms of intrafamilial support.
Especially in the conventionalmarriage, in which the
burdens of home and childcare fall mainly upon the
wife, she should be entitled to a share of what she
helped her husband earn. Accordingly, the contribu-

tion theory is sometimes expressed as a "partnership"
or "sharing" theory.
The contributiontheory is intrinsically more plausible than the support theory, because the contribution
theory responds directly to the defective maritalproperty regime of the separate-propertystates.
Remember that in community-property states there
are still plenty of needy widows, but no forced-share
statutes. Once contribution has been rewarded, nothing
m e is done to adjust the division of marital property to take
account of the sumhofs need. Thus, we see in the forcedshare system for separate-property states a contingent
marital-property regime, under which the law presumes irrebuttably that the survivor contributed
materially to the decedent's wealth.
One discrepancy between the contribution theory
and current practice is that the forced share extends to
all of the decedent's property, including property acquired before the marriage or property that came to the
decedent through gft or inheritance -in other words,
property that the survivingspouse did not help earn.
Even harder to square with the contribution theory
is that aspect of forced-sharelaw that we have advertised as its worst shortcoming, failure to take into
account the duration of the marriage. Manifestly,
the spouse of five days has not contributed remotely
as much as has the spouse of five decades. Here the
disparity between theory and implementationis so
enormous that the customary apologetics about administrative convenience are not convincing. Either
the contribution theory misdescribes the purpose of a
forced-share system that tolerates such a disparity or,
as we shall presently argue, that shortcoming of our
forced-share system needs to be repaired in order to
implement the theory properly.

Despite its worthy aspiration to redress the
inadequacy of our marital-property law, modem
forced-share law does more harm than good.
The time has come to speak of serial polygamy.
In modem times it has become increasingly common
for people to have more than one spouse -alas, not
simultaneously as in the good old days, but in a series.
Divorce and remarriage is the most common variety of
serial polygamy, a variety that now abounds in modem marriage behavior. From the standpoint of the
troubled forced-share law, we are concerned with a remarriage pattern that is not primarily associated with
divorce: the tendency among the elderly, whether divorced or widowed, to remarry later in life. The phenomenon is more noticeable among elderly men; since
fewer men survive into advanced years, their chances
of remarrying are correspondingly higher. Good data
on remarriage late in life is hard to find, but the evi-

dence of the troubled forced-share case law reqforces
our impression that the phenomenon has become
more common across the twentieth century. Growing
longevity and better health in advanced years predispose the elderly to live more fully.,and taboa~
against this sort of marriag~have probably abated.
The objection to awarding the farced s h w in these
circumstancesis manifest. The forced share deslves
upon a spouse whose contributi~nto the decedent's
wealth bears no relation to what theory presupposes.
It is wrong f o a~legal system that otherwise places
such paramount value on freedom of testatian to
abridge that freedom when the benefit flows to a per
son who stands so far outside the protective purposes.
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We wish to turn a fresh leaf and advance some proposals for legislative reform that hive not thus far been
considered.
The great attribute of community-property law that
fits it for modem patterns of marriage-behavioris that
community-property rights are automaticallyadjusted
for the duration of the mamage. The communityproperty right in a spouse's earnings attaches only
to the property earned during the persistence of
the marriage.
In the redesign of the forced-share system that we
propose in this article, we shall be imitatihg key features of community-property (and UMPA)law; but we
avoid both of the characteristic drawbacks of community law -the aumbersome lifetime dual management
regime and the tracing-to-soureg of noncommunity
property. We call for a forced-share entitlement that
is sensitive to the duration of the marriage; that is
mechanicaly determined; and that resembles the 50150
split of community and UMPA law. We envision an
accrual-type forced-share system in which the forced
share grows with the length of the marriage. The particular analogy that we have in mind is the vesting
schedule in a pension plan. Under a vesting schedule,
there are two elements to consider: the amount of the
ultimate benefit, and the rate at which one's entitlement in that benefit becomes indefeasible.

Amount:Increase the Forced-Share Fraction to Half.
In forced-share law the analogue to the retirement
benefit under a pension plan would be the statutory
fraction of the decedent's estate, which in the UPC and
most non-UPC jurisdictions is one-third of the estate.
We would increase this fraction from a third to a half,
primarily to align the forced-share fraction with the
half interest that characterizes the functionally similar
community-property and UMPA systems. (We explain
shortly that we would apply the fraction to an entity
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thet is somewhat differently caleulated than the probate estate or the "augmented estate" to which the
present statutes apply.) We suspect that the one-third
figure in present law is a hangover from the one-third
life estate in common law dower. We think the returnof-contribution theory better supports a 50150 split. L

rlr
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For convenience we shall call this class of property
the "recapturrabl~s."
i (3) The value ofmy of the survivor's property that
; the decedent had transferred gratuitously to the
Bpouse. We callthis the spousal
p ~ p e ~ .
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The U P t s forced-share fraction (presentlyonethird) is applied to this computational entity. Property
included in the augmented estate that belongs to the
survivor (spousal setoff property) or that passes to
the survivor as a result of the decedent's death is applied first to satisfy the forced share. As a result, the
decedent cannot defeat the forced share by means
of the common will substitutes; on the other hand,
a surviving spouse for whom the decedent makes
ample lifetime provision is precluded from forcing
a further share.
We propose to make a pair of furthe adjustments
in the UPCs augmented-estate system, in order to
achieve the larger purpose of approximatingthe community property/UMPA outcome.' In this instance,
the feature that we believe should be emulated is
that under community law there is a 50150 split
in the property acquired by both spouses during
i
the marriage.

Accrual: Schedule the Forced Share to Vest Over
Time. We recommend that the survivor's forcedshare entitlement be phased in, according to a pre- <:
determined formula. We call this an accrual-type -:;+:
forced share.
.

Under current law, when John and Mary leave the
Jalraron the day of their marriage, each has a one-third
;forced-share in the estate of the other. Under our proiposal, the forced-share right of each spouse would vest
'hcrementallyacross time. Suppose, for example, that
!the revised scheme allowed ten percent of the forced
share to vest upon marriage, and the remaining
190-~ercent
of the forced share to vest in five percent
]annual increments. On those numbers, it would take
:?18years for each spouse to acquire the full 100 percent
!interest in the fprceehare fraction. . : . -1..
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The Property: Combine the Spouses' Augmented
Estates but Charge the Sumivor with His Own. Our
proposal would make two alterations in the UPCs
The
augmented estate. First, we would substitute for the
i
3-;
present entity, which is constructed only on the de-.
,-,. -+
cedent's augmented estate, a combined augmented estate
that merges both the decedent's and the surviving
Our concluding group of proposals would refine the
spouse's augmented estates. This entity would, in fact,
mode of calculating the forced share, by taking into
eliminate an administrative complexity inherent in the
account the survivor's own property. This proposal,
current UPC augmented-estate entity, which requires
for which there is support in a few of the existing state
statutes, shares with our other recommendations the , .. ' ' that the spousal setoffproperty be traced. Our proposobject of approximating the outcomes that would be
I al kntails no tracing of the sources of funds of either
,
spouse-The c~mbinedaugmented estates would Conachieved under the community of acquests (or under
tain: (1) the decedent's augmented estate, now defined
UMPA),but in a mechanical fashion.
as his net probate estate plus the value of any recap
Under the community of acquests, each spouse . ' '
turables; plus (2)the s d spouse's augmented
immediately acquires a half interest in the property '.. 'estate, defined to include that spouse's net worth,
earned during the marriage by the other spouse,
which means that each spouse incurs an immediate . - together with the value of any recapturables stemming
reduction of half of the property arising from his or her - -fromthat spouse-- .
;.
*
.
earnings. Thus, when death terminates the mamage,
. :
,
- I ' - - .. :- '[ncluding the survivor's augmented estate in the;.,
the surviving spouse's property has already been
:entity to which the forced share attaches requires th
reduced by the value of the decedent spouse's
.
half interest.
second adjustment to the UPC's augmented-esta system: In satisfyingthe forced share, the summing
By contrast, most American forcedahare statute;
.
- :
spouse
must be churged with receipt of the sumivor's o
disregard the property that the survivor has earned
'
estate. That is, the survivor's own augment.
and titled in his or her name. Consider, for example,
., *augmented
-.
the UPC's augmented-estate scheme. The augmented
:- '*.? 1estate (and Property passing to the survivor as a
sult of the decedent's death) would be subtract I
estate is a tripartite computational entity that includes:
rrom
the survivor's potentid forced-shareentitlemen
.
(1) The decedent's net probate estate.
-: ,-Estateplanners familiar with modem drafting tedu
(2) The value of property that the decedent transL--. .. ques responsive to the federal transfer tax will reco
-.
ferred during the marriage by means of various
nize that our proposal would allow the elective share
.
-will substitutesto persons other than the spouse.
in a long-duration marriage to work in the nature of a
-p4
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equalization clause, hence to duplicate the 50/50split
of the community and UMPA regimes.
It will be manifest that this proposal tends in the direction of the universal community and away from the
community of acquests that we prefer in principle. Our
proposal does not exclude the property that a spouse
acquires by inheritance or g& (so-called separate property), although in a late marriage of short duration
the incremental vesting feature does tend by approximation to eliminate the value of property that was
acquired before the marriage. Our rationale is
straightforward: We opt for the more inclusive system
in order to preserve a mechanical forced share -in
order. that is, to avoid the tracing for.exclusionof separate property that the community of acquests would
require. But we think that several factors help to narrow the gap between those two models in the forcedshare context. In modem circumstances, it is unusual
for either spouse to bring siguhcant separate property
to a long-duration first marriage. Further, when substantial separate property does enter such a marriage,
it need not necessarily unbalance the spouses's holdings; an afnuent person is more likely to marry someone of the same ilk than a pauper. For short-duration
marriages, the accrual mechanism that we have
emphasized would abate the consequences of an enriched forced share by diminishing the vested portion
of the short-term spouse's forced-shareentitlement.
Finally, in the case in which there is material disparity
in the wealth of the parties, the premarital contract
would be available to oust the default regime of the
forced-sharelaw, as in current practice.

The Needy Survivor: Guarantee a Minimum
Amount. Although we have shown why it is correct to
see the contribution theory, rather than the support
theory, as the driving force behind the forced-share
system, we have also pointed out that the concepts
largely overlap. Furthermore, the support theory unmistakably underlies such ancillary measures as the
family and homestead allowances. Accordingly, we
think it consistent with a system that is in the main
based upon the contribution theory to make particular
provision for extreme need.
We recommend, therefore, a minimum share for the
impoverished survivor. Fd3y thousand dollars is the
figure we have in mind. Under our proposal the survivor is charged with receipt of his own net assets plus
the amounts shifting to the survivor at the decedent's
death. If those sums are less than the $50,000 minimum, then the survivor should be entitled -at
the least -to whatever additional portion of the
decedent's estate is necessary, up to 100 per cent,
to bring the survivof s assets up to that $50,000 level.
In the case of a late marriage, in which the survivor is
aged in the mid-70s, the $50,000 figure would be more
or less enough to provide the s u ~ v owith
r a straightlife annuity at a minimum subsistence level of approximately $10,000 per year.'

..

1

The merits of the acaual system that we have proposed should be fairly obvious in view of our critique
of existing forced-share law. The serial-polygamy
windfalls would be eliminated (and this by itself is a
further ground for increasing the amount of the forced
share from a third to a half). But because the accrualtype mechanism would work automatically, the reform would not entail the tracing and other administrative complexity associated with the community
property and UMPA regimes.
To be sure, any system that has the advantage-of
mechanical application will have the corresponding
drawback: Mechanistic justice is rough justice, and
in most areas of the law we aspire to more than rough
justice. But in the realm of forced-share law, there '
are important reasons for thinking that we cannot do
better. Forced-share law is intrinsically arbitrary. The
fixed fraction (whether a third or a half or anything
else) is arbitrary. So, too, is the very premise on which
the forced-share entitlement rests, that is, the irrebuttable presumption that the survivor contributed to
the decedent's wealth. The law codd, in theory, open
such questions to examination of the merits in each
case, but it has not, and for good reason. The proofs
would be extraordinarily difficult. The issues in such
a case would not resemble the issues in ordinary fat finding -issues such as whether the traffic light was
green or red. Examining the true merits of the case
under a forced-share system that tried to establish
the spouses' actual contributionsto the family wealth
would necessarily entail an inquiry into virtually every
facet of the spouses' conduct throughout the mamage.
Further, that litigation would a h e just when death
has sealed the lips of the most affected party. These are
the concerns that have in the past led American
policymakers to prefer a mechanical forced-share system. Accordingly, we would claim that the accrualtype system that we have recommended as a corrective
for serial-polygamy forced shares has the considerable
virtue of consistency with the rest of a mechanistic
system. The reforms we propose would not achieve
perfect justice. They would, however, achieve much
better justice for an area of private law in which the
results, at present, are too often repugnant.

john H . Langbein is the Max Pam Professor of
American and Foreign Law, University of Chicago Law School, and serves as a member of the
joint Editorial Board for the Uniform prohate
Code.

Footnotes
1. Because a forced-share system protects the property interest
of the surviving spouse, it does not recognize the contributionbased interest of the decedent spouse. The community-property
system does protect the decedent's interest as well, and in this
respect our proporsals will fall short of the aspiration to achieve
community-like outcomes. Community-like mutuality would require granting to the estate of the deceased spouse a claim against
the assets of the surviving spouse. Such a right of election would
have to devolve upon the decedent's personal representative,
where it would resemble somewhat the situation in current law
in which a fiduciary makes the election on behalf of a surviving
spouse who is incompetent. In most jurisdictions the standard for
making such an election is the survivor's need for support. If a
decedent spouse's election were created, that spouse would not
require support, but that spouse's personal representative would
owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of that spouse's estate.
The election would become virtually automatic when not waived
by a well drafted instrument, in contrast to the present situation
in which the forced share is actually exercised only rarely, in cases
of deliberate disinheritance of the survivor.

Lawrence W . Waggoner is the Lewis M . Simes
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School, and serzres as the director of research
for the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform
Probate Code.

2. The guaranteed minimum would also affect the short-duration
marriage that ends in death early in life. In the case of a late-in-life
short-duration marriage, not much wealth is acquired during the
mamage, and the accrual-type forced share produces a better result by not shifting substantial wealth in such circumstances. In
an early marriage, however, the partners typically enter the marriage with little in the way of separate property, and all or most of
the wealth will have been acquired during the mamage. Under a
community-property or UMPA regime, such property would
have been community or marital property, and thus divided
evenly between the spouses. If the mamage terminates on earlv
death of one of the spouses, the survivor would be entitled to the
community or marital half interest in the property despite the
short duration of the mamage. By contrast, under the accrualtype forced share that we propose, the short duration of the marriage would cause the vested proportion of the forced share to
fall short of the full fifty percent, and thus the surviving spouse
would be credited with an inadequate return of conhibution. This
is not a problem of frequent occurrence; an early marriage gone
sour is much more likely to end in divorce than in disinheritance
upon premature death of one of the spouses. But a minimum
entitlement of $50,000 would ameliorate, in a concededly rough
way, the rare case in which such an event came to pass.

